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 Abstract 
It has been argued that accountability is a public good that only citizens can provide. Governments 
can put institutions in place that allow citizens to hold public servants to account, but citizens must 
participate in those institutions if accountability is to be achieved. Thus, citizens face a social dilemma 
– participate in holding public servants to account at a cost in terms of time and effort or free ride, i.e. 
do not participate, while benefiting from the efforts of those who do. If this characterization of 
accountability is valid, we would expect more cooperatively inclined citizens to participate in 
accountability institutions, while the less cooperatively inclined do not. We test the validity of this 
characterization by investigating the correlation between individual behavior in a simple public goods 
game and their participation in local and national accountability institutions in Albania. We involve a 
nationally representative sample of 1800 adults with children in primary school. We find significant 
correlations between cooperativeness and participation in school accountability institutions and 
national elections, both at the individual level and the district level.  These correlations are robust to 
the introduction of many controls in the analysis and, in the case of national elections, to the use of 
official election turn-out statistics in place of self-reported turn-out. 
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1. Introduction 
There is general agreement that participatory institutions are a necessary condition for accountability, 
especially where top-down institutions are malfunctioning or missing. Under the participatory approach, 
governments put institutions in place that allow citizens to play an active role in keeping service providers 
accountable. This is done by connecting citizens to policy makers through the instrument of the vote, i.e. 
by relying on a “long route” to accountability, and/or by connecting citizens directly to service providers, 
i.e. by creating a “short route” to accountability.1 Recently, empirical investigations of the effectiveness 
of participatory institutions have been conducted in many different countries. In education, reforms 
aiming to improve accountability by increasing parental participation in schools – also called school-
based management reforms (e.g. Banerjee et al, 2010; Blimpo and Evans, 2011; Duflo et al., 2011; 
Pradhan et al. 2011) provide mixed evidence of success, yet the reasons for the contrasting results 
obtained in different societies are unclear.  
One possible explanation for the mixed evidence lies in heterogeneities in individuals’ and 
communities’ willingness and ability to overcome collective action problems. The first step toward 
successful participatory accountability is individual participation, but participation itself is a social 
dilemma; it involves a private cost, yet it benefits others, and its efficacy requires a significant number of 
participants. Hence, participation might be subject to “free-riding” (Samuelson, 1954; Olson, 1965; 
Grossman and Hart, 1980; Ostrom, 1998) and it follows that effective participatory accountability may 
depend, at least partly, on individuals’ propensity to cooperate with others for the common good.2 This is 
an important issue that has been overlooked by the empirical literature. Theoretical insights have been 
provided by studies on voter turnout. Seminal work in political science (Downs, 1957) suggested that 
voting is an irrational act because the expected benefit of voting, i.e. the probability that one’s vote is 
pivotal multiplied by the differential benefit generated by the preferred electoral outcome, is lower than 
the cost of voting. Later studies showed that the paradox of voting could be solved by taking into account 
the intrinsic benefits, such as the satisfaction from compliance with the ethic of voting (Riker and 
Ordeshook, 1968), and/or the benefits that voting generates for society. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 
1985) were the first to suggest that the decision to go to vote has the characteristics of a “participation 
game”, i.e., given that the electoral outcome itself is non-excludable and non-rival and the act of voting 
involves a private cost, turning out to vote has the characteristics of a collective action problem.  
                                                           
1
 Accountability refers to “the act of holding public officials and service providers answerable for processes and outcomes, and 
imposing penalties if specified outputs and outcomes are not delivered” (Lewis and Petterson, 2009).The long- and short-rote 
accountability terminology was introduced by the World Bank (see World Bank, 2004). 
2
 As stated by Platteau (2008), in order for participation to be effective, “community members must be able to use the available 
information jointly in a way that creates some action, that is, they must be able to come together, share and discuss their 
knowledge and be ready to act on it” (p. 128). 
3 
 
In this paper, we investigate whether, both at the individual- and the community-level, willingness to 
cooperate with others for the common good is associated with parents’ willingness to participate in school 
accountability institutions, i.e., a “short route” to accountability, and to vote in national elections, i.e., a 
“long route” to accountability. We therefore test whether a single behavioral tendency drives decision-
making in two contexts that, while different in scale and specific purpose, are both accountability-related 
and present individuals with a dilemma taking the form of a participation game. We conduct our study in 
Albania, a country that slowly transitioned from communism to a parliamentary democracy in the 1990s, 
and that, like other new democracies in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, is characterized by limited active 
civil society, owing to policies implemented by former regimes to either eliminate groups mediating 
between the individual and the state or control groups in order to prevent organized opposition to the 
regime (Lipset, 1994).3 Our analysis is based on a comprehensive survey of 1800 parents randomly 
selected from a nationally representative sample of 180 primary schools. 
Measuring individuals’ willingness to cooperate with others for the common good is challenging. 
Attitudinal survey measures, such as the standard GSS trust variable, are likely to suffer from a 
hypothetical or cheap-talk bias, i.e., individuals’ answers might not be truthful when they refer to 
hypothetical situations or past events that cannot be verified by the surveyor.4 Survey questions referring 
to actions in everyday life, such as membership in organizations, are less likely to suffer from these biases 
as they are, in principal, verifiable. However, they are likely to suffer from significant noise due to 
unobserved heterogeneity in the decision-making context.5 We overcome these measurement challenges 
by involving our subjects in a simplified version of the public goods game first introduced by Cardenas 
and Jaramillo (2007), thus generating a direct measure of individual willingness to cooperate with others 
for the common good. We correlate cooperativeness in the game with the decision to participate in both a 
short route to accountability, i.e. the decision to participate in the election of parent class representatives, 
and a long route to accountability, i.e., the decision to vote in the most recent parliamentary elections. For 
the latter variable we use both self-reported voting at the individual level, and official records of voter 
turnout at the district level. 
Experimental studies employing public goods games have shown that individuals vary markedly in 
their willingness to cooperate with others for the common good (see Isaac and Walker, 1988; Fehr and 
Gachter, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Fischbacker and Gachter, 2010, among 
                                                           
3
 For instance, in Albania religious practices were officially banned in 1967, to be reinstated in the 1990s. 
4
 This might be due to what Carpenter (2002) refers to as the idealized persona bias, i.e. a desire to appear as the person one 
would like to be rather than what they are, and/or the surveyor effect, i.e. the desire to answer in accordance to what one thinks 
the surveyor would like to hear or see. 
5
 For general discussions of the limitations of attitudinal survey measures, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), Manski (2004) 
and Delavande et al (2011). For assessments of attitudinal survey measures based on a comparison with the corresponding 
experimental measures, see Ahn et al. (2003), Ashraf et al. (2003), Cardenas et al. (2013),Gaechter et al. (2004) and Glaeser et 
al. (2000).  
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others).6 Moreover, a few additional experimental studies (Henrich et al., 2005; Herrmann et al., 2008; 
Gaechter et al., 2010) have highlighted that a significant proportion of the variation in individuals’ 
willingness to cooperate occurs at the community or society level.7 The nature and scale of our survey 
sampling allows us to investigate whether and how the distribution of willingness to cooperate varies 
spatially within Albania. Contrary to most experimental studies conducted in the lab or in the field, we 
involved a large representative sample of non-student adults – a total of 1800 individuals – covering the 
entire Albanian territory.  
We find that individuals who behave cooperatively in the public goods game are significantly more 
likely to participate in the election of parent class representatives who go on to elect parent 
representatives to the school board. This relationship remains significant after controlling for the degree 
to which parents are informed about aspects of local accountability in schools. Moreover, parents who 
behave cooperatively in the public goods game are more likely to vote in national elections, according to 
both self-reported voting and district-level records of official turnout. Our data show significant variation 
in both participation and cooperativeness across districts, and district-level analysis confirms that districts 
characterized by a higher proportion of cooperative parents have both a higher degree of participation in 
school accountability and a higher turnout in the 2009 elections according to official records. Our results 
are robust to changes in the context in which participation is defined, the scale of the analysis and the 
empirical specification.  
The finding that the same behavioral driver applies to two participation contexts – a local one and a 
national one – that differ in scale, specific purpose, associated costs and benefits, and the extent to which 
individual participation decisions are visible to others, is remarkable. It indicates that the collective-action 
characteristic of accountability systems is fundamentally important and suggests that interventions aimed 
at increasing individual cooperativeness could succeed in improving both participation in local 
accountability institutions and civic engagement at the national level. 
Finally, we note that our study also contributes to the literature on the external validity of public 
goods experiments by providing evidence of a correlation between behavior within a lab-type public 
goods game and behavior in naturally occurring decision-contexts within which inter-personal 
cooperation is also salient. While cooperative tendencies in public goods experiments have been shown to 
correlate with the management of forest commons by forest user groups in Ethiopia (Rustagi et al. 2010), 
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 For comprehensive reviews of the experimental literature relating to behavior in public goods experiments see Ledyard (1995) 
and Chaudhuri (2011). 
7
 One important society characteristic that has been shown to be negatively correlated with individual contributions to a public 
good (Habyarimana et al. 2007), participation in community activities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000), community-based 
monitoring of public service providers (Bjorkman and Svensson, 2010), and local public good provision (Miguel and Gugerty, 
2004) is ethnic fragmentation. Neighborhood social and economic inequalities have also been shown to matter for urban violence 
(Morenoff, Sampson and Raudenbush, 2001) and collective civic action (Sampson et al., 2005). 
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with Japanese fishermen’s productivity when pooling their catches with other fishermen (Carpenter and 
Seki, 2011), and Brazilian fishermen’s propensity not to over-exploit common fishing grounds (Fehr and 
Leibbrandt, 2011), this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study providing evidence of a correlation 
between individuals’ behavior in a public goods experiment and their willingness to cooperate with others 
in participatory accountability systems and civic engagement.  
The paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes the Albanian context focusing, in particular, on 
the education sector. Section 3 describes the school survey and the public goods experiment. Section 4 
presents descriptive statistics about the surveyed parents and explores individual and community 
characteristics affecting parents’ cooperativeness in the public goods game. Section 5 reports our 
empirical results, and Section 6 provides some conclusions. 
 
 
2. The Albanian context  
2.1 A new democracy 
Albania was the last country in Europe to participate in the “third wave of democracy” (Huntington, 
1991).  Despite the high levels of economic growth experienced during the democratic transition, Albania 
remains one of the poorest in Europe, with a per capita GDP of 8,000 USD (2010 international PPP $). 
Albania’s relative underdevelopment has been attributed, in part, to the slowness of its transition to 
democracy relative to other Eastern European countries. The new democratic constitution was adopted in 
1998. Since then, there have been three parliamentary elections – not without controversies concerning 
electoral fraud, protests and boycotts by the losing party. In each, voter turnout has been around 50%.  
Data from the 2010 Life in Transition Survey (LiTS) show that about 70 per cent of Albanians do not 
think that free and fair elections exist in their country.8  
 Albania’s slow transition to democracy has been attributed to the unique characteristics of its 
communist regime: its isolation from other countries, including the Soviet bloc, for half a century; the 
elimination of intellectuals (including western-educated Albanians); the abolition of religious practices; 
and the harsh persecution of opponents to the regime. With the end of communism, a new era began. One 
of the consequences of the repression of civic organizations during the communist regime is the lack of an 
active civil society, i.e. formal and informal organizations (with or without political objectives) and 
voluntary community participation, in the newly formed democracy of Albania.9 This is consistent with 
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 For further details see: http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/transitionII.shtml 
9
 According to Talifi (2008), most of the efforts to build a civil society in Albania – primarily undertaken by donor-based NGOs 
– have relied on awareness campaigns and capacity building, and have emphasized the importance of an informed society and 
electoral base. The inherent shortcoming of this approach is the assumption that by informing people about democratic and 
participatory institutions, participation will follow. Talifi (2008) argues that “this approach of civil society has decreased rather 
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the existing evidence that totalitarian regimes destroy social capital (see Paldan and Svendsen, 2000; 
Rose, 1993; Smolar, 1996). 
Geographically, Albania is subdivided into twelve counties and thirty-six districts. Culturally, the 
country is characterized by a North-South divide, with the North traditionally relying on a patriarchal 
tribal system and being more isolated than the market-oriented South (Doll, 2003; Shala, 1997; Lawson 
and Saltmarshe, 2000).10 The North-South cultural division also reflects a strong political polarization: the 
Northern regions are traditionally and historically allied to the Democratic Party (in office since 2005) 
while the Southern regions support the Socialist Party (in office from 1997 to 2005).11 Besides the north-
south distinction, Albania can be further divided in four main geographical areas – Coastal, Centre, 
Mountain and Tirana, with the Mountain region being the most remote and poorest and the Coastal region 
being the most developed. Migration from the Mountain region to the Coast and Tirana has increased 
markedly over the last 15 years, and explains the increasing heterogeneity in the coastal population.  
 
2.2 The education sector 
In the years following the transition, there was a sharp decline in the coverage and quality of social 
services. School enrolment rates dropped and, in some areas, have still not recovered to pre-transition 
levels. Although 99% of the adult population is literate, the quality of education is low, as shown by 
Albania’s performance in the 2009 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA). More than 50% 
of 15 years old students found it difficult “to use continuous texts unless the texts are short and clearly 
sign-posted; and even with such texts, they are unlikely to be able to do more than identify a main idea or 
find explicitly stated information.”12 
The Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) is the central government body responsible for 
implementing education policies and managing the education system. This responsibility is exercised by 
staff in the MoES and in twelve administration entities (REDs) functioning at the county level. The 
institutional framework currently in place relies on a system that assigns the task of monitoring teachers 
and imposing penalties for under-performance to administrative units, i.e., the twelve REDs, that are not 
directly held to account by service recipients, i.e., it relies on top-down accountability. 13 However, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
than increased public participation in the process, because simply telling people to participate is not a good enough approach to 
contribute to the democratization of the country”. 
10
 The North and the South also differ in the main dialects spoken, i.e. the Gheg in the North and the Tosk in the South. 
11
 Since 1997, Albania has relied on a proportional voting system. The Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP) are the 
two dominant parties. In the 2009 elections, the DP obtained 40.18% of votes, all from the North, and the PD obtained 40.85% of 
votes, all from the South. As shown by Gërxhani and Schram (2000, 2009), Albanian politics is dominated by clientelism and 
patronage, whereby the party in power favors its own supporting regions over the rest of the country, and voters support their 
“own” party no matter what. 
12
 See http://www.portugal.gov.pt/pt/GC18/Documentos/ME/PISA_2009_1.pdf 
13
 The existing top-down system is functioning poorly in terms of accountability. According to our school survey, it is very 
common for teachers to believe that there are no negative repercussions to bad performance: about 50% indicated that they would 
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MoES has recently been promoting community engagement in school governance structures through 
parent committees and school boards. Parent committees are composed of elected parent class 
representatives, and school boards are composed of two or more (depending on the size of the school) 
parent representatives, one teacher representative, a student representative, a community representative 
and a RED representative. Parent class representatives are elected by the parents of pupils in their 
respective classes at the beginning of the school year. They, then, elect representatives from amongst 
themselves to the school boards.  
While school boards have always existed, they have recently been given greater responsibilities for 
school governance. The main functions of the School Board are to examine and approve (by voting) the 
school’s mid-term and annual plans and the school’s annual financial report. The board also has 
decisional power for the adoption of curricula and textbooks, as well as the school’s budget relating to 
contributions from the community or other donors, or revenues from school activities. School Board 
members may also discuss problems relating to the performance of teachers, or school directors, 
following complaints from parents, students, or teachers. Since 2008, the school director is not a member 
of the school board and, although he/she can still participate in meetings, he/she cannot vote.  
3. The School Stakeholder Survey  
 We conducted the Albania School Stakeholder Survey as part of the World Bank’s Accountability 
for Better Governance Program. The survey was primarily aimed at investigating the role that parents 
play in the institutional framework within which primary schools currently operate. We complemented 
our survey data with data from official records on district-level voter turnout in the 2009 parliamentary 
elections. 
3.1 Survey design and implementation 
 The data collection took place between October and December 2009 in a representative sample of 180 
primary schools, offering grades one to nine. The sampling strategy relied on stratification at the district 
level; the number of schools randomly selected to participate in the survey in each district depended on 
the number of pupils attending primary school in that district.14 For each school, three and seven students 
were randomly selected from grades three and six respectively. Then, the parents of the selected pupils 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not receive a penalty if they underperformed. Moreover, those who thought they would be penalized were unclear with respect to 
what kind of penalty they would receive. 
14
 The sample was drawn from the list of all public primary schools in Albania. There are 2691 public basic level schools in 
Albania, of which 12 percent are located in urban areas. Out of the 2691 primary schools, we defined as “eligible” those schools 
with five or more pupils in grade three, and ten or more pupils in grade six. Only 1623 of the 2691 primary schools in the 
complete list met this eligibility criterion. However, only 9 percent of all Albanian public primary school pupils attend ineligible 
schools. The list of eligible schools was then divided into 36 strata according to district and either six, four or two schools was 
randomly sampled from each, the number depending on the number of pupils attending primary school in the district. Since the 
district of Tirana contained twice the percentage of pupils as well as twice the number of eligible schools, it was divided into two 
strata, Tirana Municipality and Tirana District, leading to a total of 37 strata.  
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were invited to participate in a workshop that took place in the school premises. The MoES assisted in the 
implementation of the survey by demanding the full cooperation of school directors and teachers in the 
sampled schools. Invitations to parents were made via messages carried home by the selected students and 
by phone, after acquiring phone numbers from school records. The invitations emphasized the show-up 
fees that participants would receive upon arrival to the workshop. Either one of the parents, but not both, 
could participate in the survey and experiment. The parent who participated in the study was self-selected, 
which is not ideal from a scientific viewpoint, yet is reflects a similar self-selection process that takes 
place when parents have to decide whether and who will go to their kids’ school to participate in the 
election of class parent representatives. About 57% of our survey participants were female.  
Financial incentives, i.e., monetary payoffs from the behavioral games, and the enumerators’ 
willingness to visit the reluctant parents in person allowed us to achieve a 100 per cent parent 
participation rate. Besides the parents of the selected pupils, one teacher of the third graders and four 
teachers of the sixth graders were randomly selected to participate in the survey and experiments together 
with the parents of the selected pupils. Therefore, in each school we collected data from ten parents and 
five teachers, leading to total sample sizes of 1800 parents and 900 teachers. 
  
3.2 The public good game 
In order to generate a direct measure of individuals’ propensities to coordinate and cooperate with 
others to solve collective action problems, we undertook a laboratory experiment conducted in the field. 
Experiments facilitate the measurement of individuals’ values, beliefs and preferences that are difficult to 
capture using surveys. Experimentally generated measures of individual preferences for cooperation in 
the context of a public goods game have been shown to correlate with individuals’ behavior in everyday 
life in a number of contexts. Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) found that Brazilian fishermen who behaved 
more selfishly in a public goods game were more likely to over-exploit common fishing grounds. 
Carpenter and Seki (2011) found that Japanese fishermen’s behavior in a public goods game predicted 
their productivity when pooling their catches with other fishermen. Rustagi et al. (2010) found that forest 
users groups that show higher levels of conditional cooperation in a public goods game are more 
successful in forest commons management. 15  Public goods games have also been used following 
randomized interventions to identify changes in individuals’ attitudes and preferences. For instance, 
Fearon et al. (2011) and Casey et al. (2012) employed a public goods game to assess the impact of a 
community driven development initiative on individuals’ ability to overcome collective action problems 
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 A number of other studies find significant correlations between behavior in laboratory experiments other than the public goods 
game and behavior outside the lab. See for instance: Carpenter and Myers (2010); Karlan, 2005; Barr and Serneels, 2009; Serra et 
al., 2011. For a recent review of studies that find correlations between behavior in laboratory experiments and out-of-the-lab 
behavior see Camerer (2014). 
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respectively in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Similarly, Attanasio et al. (2009) employed a public goods game 
to compare individuals’ propensities to cooperate with each other in two communities in Colombia, one 
that had received conditional cash transfers for over two years, and one that had not.   
We adapted the binary public goods game of Cardenas and Jaramillo (2007) to the Albanian context. 
All surveyed parents and teachers participated in the experiment on their school premises. Thus, each 
experimental session included 15 subjects. Each participant was given a voucher and had to decide 
whether to invest their voucher either in a group account or a private account. If an individual invested in 
the group account, he/she would get 100 LEK plus 100 LEK multiplied by the number of other 
participants investing in the group account:16  = 100 + 100	 , with j  i, where  indicates the 
earnings of individual i from investing in the group account, and 	 indicates the total number of other 
participants who invested in the group account. If an individual invested in the private account, he/she 
would get 500 LEK plus 100 LEK multiplied by the number of other participants investing in the group 
account: 

 = 500 + 100	
 , with j  i. It follows that the marginal per capita return ratio (MPCR) 
from investing in the group account was set equal to 0.20, and the experimental parameters were such that 
at least 5 investors in the group account were needed for each investor to earn at least as much as he/she 
would earn by investing in the private account with all the other participants doing likewise.  
The dominant strategy is to invest in the private account, since it yields higher earnings no matter 
what the others do. Consequently, the Nash equilibrium is that everyone invests in the private account and 
earns 500 LEK. In stark contrast, in the social optimum everyone invests in the group account and earns 
1500 LEK. 
Each experimental session was conducted using a large classroom with all fifteen subjects seated at 
well-spaced desks. On arrival, each subject was registered and asked to blindly pick a badge bearing a 
number. Following registration, each subject was invited to sit at the desk bearing their badge number. 
Then the experiment was introduced.17 A white board was used to explain all possible configurations of 
individual payoffs conditional on the investment decisions of the other participants. Two field researchers 
explained the game to all the participants. One field researcher read the written instructions, provided in 
Appendix, aloud to the group while the other wrote the corresponding numerical examples on the white 
board. The field researchers were trained to spend as much time as needed explaining the rules of the 
game and proceed to the decision-making phase of the experiment only when all the subjects showed a 
clear understanding of the rules of the game. Vouchers were then distributed among participants. Each 
voucher bore a letter P (for Private Account) and the letter G (for Group Account). Participants were 
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 At the time of the experiment, 1000 LEK corresponded to the daily wage of the average Albanian. 
17
 Subjects also played as a standard Dictator Game (DG) and a third-party punishment. The behavior of parents and teachers in 
the DG and TPP games is not relevant for the purpose of this paper. For a full description of the Albania School Stakeholder 
survey and lab experiments, see Serra, Barr and Packard (2011). 
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asked to circle the letter corresponding to the account in which they wished to invest their voucher. The 
game was played only once, and there was no communication among participants.18 The implementation 
of the game took between 30 and 50 minutes. However, the experimental sessions in full, including 
registration, implementation of all games, computation of payoffs and payment of participants, lasted 
between 3 and 4 hours. The same experimental protocol was followed in all schools, with the exception of 
one feature of the design; in half of the schools the investment in the group account was explained by 
using an example relating to the education sector and in the other half it was explained by using an 
example relating to farming.19 
 
4 The data 
4.1 Individual characteristics 
 We collected data on parents’ demographics as well as their involvement in the school 
accountability system, i.e. whether they participated in the latest elections of parent class representatives, 
which occurred in September 2009, i.e. between 2 and 8 weeks before the data collection. We also 
elicited data on the degree to which each parent was informed about the existence of local accountability 
institutions, and their involvement in other aspects of their children’s education, such as the number of 
meetings with the head teacher in the previous semester and how often they helped their children with 
homework.  In designing the School Stakeholder Survey, we purposely replicated some relevant 2008 
Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS)20 questions concerning education and social 
engagement, with the aim of checking the extent to which our sample of parents is representative of the 
Albanian adult population. With respect to social engagement, we collected information about: 1) 
membership in voluntary organizations; 2) participation in any community activity in the past year; 3) 
beliefs about community members’ willingness to cooperate with each other in case of a water shortage; 
and 4) a measure of generalized trust. After the subjects participated in the public goods game, we also 
collected information about the existing social ties between the experimental participants. We therefore  
 
                                                           
18
 Participation in elections of various kinds is a repeated behavior and, this being the case, it would have been interesting to 
conduct a repeated public goods game. However, for logistical reasons, we chose to conduct a one shot game. The simplicity of 
the game ensured that it would be readily understood by participants of varying cognitive ability and could be conducted using 
only universally available technologies such as pens, paper and pin boards. This, in turn, reduced the likelihood of our field 
research team having to deviate from the original sample design for any reason. 
19
 See the instructions in Appendix for a full description of the examples employed in both versions of the public goods 
experiment. As we discuss in the next section, the specific example used does not affect the correlation between individuals’ 
behavior in the public goods game and their participation in accountability systems. For an example of a study finding evidence 
of framing effects in a public goods game conducted with salmon fishers and reindeer herders in Russia, see Gerkey (2013).  
20
 The 2008 LSMS is the third household survey conducted by the Albanian National Statistics Office with the technical 
assistance of the World Bank. The LSMS sampling relies on a stratification scheme based on four regions: Coastal Area, Central 
Area, Mountain Area, and Tirana; and included 450 Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) and 8 households in each PSU, for a total of 
3600 households. The sampling is designed to be representative of Albania as a whole. The survey provides information about 
household characteristics, including demographics, education, as well as measures of social engagement.  
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Table 1 
Individual Characteristics 
 
School 
Stakeholder 
Survey 
2008 LSMS District-level 
coefficient of 
correlation 
 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Demographics 
    
 
Average years of education 10.98 3.25 10.73 3.36   0.25 
Average age 40.17 6.39 44.22 17.58 - 0.27 
Wealth indicator 0.00 0.92 n.a. n.a. 
  0.52*** 
Household yearly income (in 000LEK) n.a. n.a. 385 1,894 
Survey-based measures of social engagement 
    
 
Belongs to an organization (church, political group, sport etc.) 0.02 0.15 0.24 0.75 - 0.08 
Participated in any community activity in the past year 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.31 - 0.01 
Thinks village members would cooperate in the case of water 
shortage 0.72 0.45 0.64 0.48 - 0.15 
Think that “most people can be trusted” 0.13 0.34 0.27 0.17 - 0.02 
% of relatives or friends among other parents 0.06 0.90 n.a. n.a.  
Involvement with the pupil’s education: 
    
 
Help with homework at least once a week 0.76 0.43 0.54 0.50   0.06 
Number of meetings with head teacher in the previous 
semester 4.52 3.3 n.a. n.a. 
  0.34** 
Number of visits to the child's school in the previous year  n.a. n.a. 8.73 3.39 
Information about participatory accountability institutions: 
    
 
Knows about the existence of parent class representatives 0.72 0.45 n.a. n.a.  
Knows about the existence of the school board 0.58 0.49 n.a. n.a. 
  0.32* Knows about the existence of participatory accountability 
institutions at the school level n.a. n.a. 0.68 0.47 
   
 Participation in the last elections of parent class 
representatives 0.50 0.50 n.a. n.a.  
Knows about the existence of parent class representatives 0.72 n.a. n.a.  Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
have a number of survey measures of individuals’ involvement in the community, which might also be 
interpreted as proxies for individual-level and/or community-level social capital.21 However, given the 
measurement problems that characterize these proxies, we devote minimal attention to their analysis and 
interpretation. 22 We nevertheless incorporate them in our empirical analysis as control variables to test 
the robustness of our main findings. While we consider our experimental proxy to be a superior measure 
                                                           
21
 There are many definitions and conceptualizations of social capital. Some researchers use the term social capital to refer to the 
structure of communities, i.e. the presence of network structures defining “bonding” and/or “bridging” links among community 
members (e.g., Putnam, 2000), while others use it to refer to individual attitudes and preferences such as propensities to trust and 
cooperate with others (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Bowles and Gintis, 2002). Carpenter (2002) aimed to reconcile these two strands of 
the literature by referring to the former conceptualization as associational social capital and the latter as behavioral social 
capital. Our experimental measure of individuals’ willingness to cooperate with others could be viewed as a measure of 
behavioral social capital. 
22
 For assessments of attitudinal survey measures based on a comparison with the corresponding experimental measures, see Ahn 
et al. (2003), Ashraf et al. (2003), Gaechter et al. (2004) and Glaeser et al. (2000). For a discussion and comparison of the survey 
based and the experimental based measures of social capital, see Carpenter (2002). 
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of the behavioral tendency we are interested in capturing, we see the survey measures as potentially 
important controls capturing unobservable factors such us heterogeneous local institutional environments 
and differential opportunities for cooperation outside the school environment.  
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the 1800 parents randomly selected to participate in the 2009 
School Stakeholder Survey and the characteristics of the adult Albanian population selected to participate 
in the 2008 Albanian Living Standards Measurement Survey.23  For each variable we aggregated the data 
at the district level and computed district-level correlations between the two samples. We also tested for 
equality of district-level means.  
The most apparent demographic characteristic that differentiates our subjects from the LSMS subjects 
is the fact that they are all parents of elementary school kids. As a consequence, there are significant 
differences in the age distributions of the two populations. While the average ages are strikingly similar 
across the two samples, the minimum age in our sample is 29 as opposed to 18 in the LSMS adult sample 
and the maximum age in our sample is 60 as opposed to 101 in the LSMS sample. Moreover 20 per cent 
of the LSMS respondents are older than 60. When aggregating the data at the district level, we find that 
average age is significantly higher in the LSMS sample. We find no district-level correlation between the 
average age of our subjects and the LSMS subjects. There is also no significant correlation between our 
survey measures of trust, memberships in organizations, participation in community activities and beliefs 
about villagers’ cooperation attitudes. With the exception of participation in community activities, the 
means of the social engagement variables are significantly different across the two samples. On the other 
hand, there are significant district-level correlations between the income variable elicited in the LSMS 
survey and our wealth index, which we constructed following Filmer and Pritchett (2001), i.e. by 
conducting principal factor analysis on the subjects’ answers to 14 questions about ownership of 
consumer durables, such as washing machines, refrigerators, ovens, cars, and mobile phones.24 Table 1 
reports the resulting first factor, which we refer to as a household wealth indicator. We also find 
significant district-level correlations between our survey variables and the LSMS variables that refer 
directly to individuals’ involvement in their children’s education and their information about participatory 
institutions at the school level.25 The statistics obtained for these variables in the two samples are also 
                                                           
23
 Table A1 in Appendix reports the specific questions used in the two surveys to generate measures of social engagement and of 
parental involvement with their children’s education. 
24
 Principal factor analysis is a technique used to summarize information contained in a large number of correlated variables into 
a smaller number of mutually uncorrelated components. The first factor or component is the linear index of all the observed 
variables that captures the most common variation among them. The first factor or component in our analysis captures 53% of the 
common variation among the 14 asset variables. We do not have income data from our survey. The district-level coefficient of 
correlation between our asset variable and the income variable collected by the LSMS, equal to 0.52 and significant at the 1 per 
cent level, suggests that our proxy does a good job in capturing wealth differences across our survey participants. 
25
 The coefficient of correlation between average number of meetings with the head teacher in our survey and number of visits to 
the school in the LSMS is equal to 0.34 and significant at the 5 per cent level. The coefficient of correlation between the 
percentage of informed parents in our survey and in the LSMS is equal to 0.32 and significant at the 10 per cent level. 
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very similar. For instance, 72% of our surveyed parents are informed about the existence of parent class 
representatives in our survey, and 68% of the LSMS respondents are informed about the existence of 
parent-teacher associations or “other means for parents to be involved in school activities”.26 
To summarize, we found significant district-level correlations between our wealth index and the 
income variable elicited in the LSMS survey, as well as the variables that refer directly to individuals’ 
involvement in their children’s education and their information about participatory institutions at the 
school level. However, we found no significant correlation between the LSMS and our survey measures 
of trust, memberships in organizations, participation in community activities and beliefs about villagers’ 
cooperation attitudes. The latter may be due to the significant difference in age distribution between the 
LSMS and our sample. Overall, the comparisons displayed in Table 1 suggest that our sample is 
representative of Albanian adults that are parents of elementary school children. 
The last row of Table 1 shows that 50% of the surveyed parents participated in the last elections of 
parent class representatives. Parental participation varies significantly across counties, ranging from 33% 
in the Shkoder county to 63% in the Vlore county. Further disaggregation to the district level shows an 
even greater variation in the proportion of participating parents, ranging from 18% in the Shkoder district 
to 95% in the Delvine district (See Table A2 in Appendix). Chi-squared tests show that the county-level 
and district-level differences in participation are significant at the 1 per cent level. Participation is also 
highly variable across schools, ranging from no participating parents (among the surveyed ones), 
observed in 5 per cent of the schools, to full participation, observed in 3 per cent of the schools. Due to 
the observational nature of our data, we are unable to establish whether there is a causal link from 
parental participation to better school outcomes. However, simple correlations show that in schools with 
higher levels of parental participation more students excel in Math and Albanian in the eighth grade 
centrally administered leaving examination, fewer students fail such exams and fewer students repeat a 
year. Moreover schools with more participating parents seem to be characterized by significantly higher 
parental satisfaction and lower (perceived) corruption in the form of embezzlement of school resources 
(see Table A2 in Appendix). 
 
4.2 Cooperative behavior in the public goods experiment 
In the public goods game, 75%, of the parents invested in the group account rather than the private 
account. There are only three public goods experiments that are comparable to ours. Cardenas et al. 
(2013) found that the percentage of contributors to the group account in 6 Latin American capitals ranged 
between 12% in Bogota’ and 47% in Caracas. In two different neighborhoods in Colombia, Attanasio et 
                                                           
26
 At the district level, the differences between the averages of the variables measuring parents’ involvement with their children’s 
education and information about accountability systems are statistically significant.  
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al. (2009) found that 7% and 33% of the participants invested in the group account.27 However, the public 
goods games used in both of these studies involved much smaller MPCRs, 0.10 in Cardenas et al. and 
0.08 in Attanasio et al., and require a larger number of contributors to the group account in order for each 
contributor to earn at least as much as he/she would earn by investing in the private account, 10 in 
Cardenas et al. and 13 in Attanasio et al. Therefore, by design, our experiment was likely to generate a 
higher rate of contribution to the group account among other regarding subjects.28 Barr et al. (2013) 
conducted a dichotomous public goods game in Uganda employing the same payoff structure as in our 
game, hence the same MPCR of 0.20, but involving groups of 12 rather than 15 individuals. The 
percentage of individuals contributing to the public good in Uganda ranged from 50 to 70 per cent across 
treatments and subject types – the game involved teacher representatives, head teachers, parent 
representatives and management representatives.29 
We see significant differences in cooperation across counties, ranging from 61% in Fier to 88% in 
Gjirokaster. A Chi-squared test shows that the between-county differences are statistically significant at 
the 1 per cent level. At the district level, the variation in the percentage of cooperating parents is even 
more striking, ranging from 47% in the district of Lushnje to 95% in the district of Delvine (see Table A3 
in Appendix). The differences in cooperating behavior across districts are statistically significant at the 1 
per cent level. A linear probability model employing only the district dummies as explanatory variables 
shows that the 36 districts account for 6 per cent of the variation in individual cooperativeness in the 
game, and for 25 per cent of the variation in cooperativeness across schools.30  
One community characteristic that has been shown to affect individual contributions to public goods 
(Habyarimana et al. 2007) and participation in community activities (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2000) is 
ethnic fragmentation. Comparing cooperation in the four main geographical areas of Tirana, the Coast, 
the Centre and the Mountain shows that parental cooperation in the game is significantly lower in the 
coastal area. This may be owing to the recent flow of migrants from the Mountains to the Coast and the 
consequently growing linguistic and cultural fragmentation in that region. Finally, while Albania is a 
                                                           
27
 The authors relate these different percentages to the fact that in the previous two years the latter neighbourhood had been 
involved in a conditional cash transfer scheme that had a community engagement component. 
28
 In choosing the parameters for our game, we were guided by the particular characteristics and historical background of 
Albania. Expecting Albanians to be relatively uncooperative, we parameterised the game so that cooperation among participants 
would be more attractive than in previous parameterisations.   
29
 Henrich et al. (2005) show that, in standard public goods games conducted in 5 small-scale societies, the percentage of “free-
riders”, i.e. participants who contributed nothing into a public account, ranged from 0 to 5%; however the public good games 
employed had a much higher MPCR (0.40 or 0.50) and smaller groups (4 or 5 people). Cardenas and Carpenter (2008) review 
studies employing public goods experiments in the field, and report that average contribution range from 33% of endowment in 
Chile  (Henrich and Smith , 2004) to 81% in Peru (Karlan, 2005).    
30
 The public good game was played also by 5 teachers. The behavior of teachers is remarkably similar to that of parents, with 
76% of teachers investing in the group account, and variations among counties and districts being highly statistically significant. 
Moreover, there is a strong positive correlation between the behavior of teachers and the behavior of parents in the public goods 
game at the district level. The coefficient of correlation is 0.44 and is significant at the 1% level. This suggests that cooperative 
tendencies are shared by different actor-types embedded in the same communities. Given the focus of the paper on participatory 
accountability, here we focus only on the behavior of parents. 
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prevalently Muslim country, a significant number of followers of other religions (Orthodox and Catholic 
Christianity) exist. 31  Based on the LSMS data, we constructed a district-level proxy for religious 
homogeneity, i.e., a dummy equal to 1 if in the district there exists a religion whose followers constitute 
more than 90 per cent of the population, and 0 otherwise. About 40 per cent of the districts are religiously 
homogeneous, and the percentage of cooperating parents in these districts is 78 per cent, against 73 per 
cent in more heterogeneous districts; the difference is significant at the 5 per cent level.  
 
Table 2 
Determinants of cooperativeness in the public good game 
 Dependent variable:  
Dummy equal to 1 if parent invested in the group account,  
0 otherwise 
 Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Age -2E-04 -5E-04 -4E-04 -4E-04 -7E-04 
 (0.927) (0.802) (0.808) (0.806) (0.688) 
Female -0.012 -0.010 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003 
 (0.584) (0.656) (0.883) (0.989) (0.878) 
Wealth index 0.019 0.022 *0.028* **0.031** 0.023 
 (0.219) (0.151) (0.052) (0.036) (0.109) 
Years of schooling 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.002 
 (0.375) (0.304) (0.355) (0.322) (0.562) 
Member of a social organization  -0.040 -0.046 -0.048 -0.035 
  (0.610) (0.564) (0.549) (0.646) 
Participated in community activities  -0.032 -0.034 -0.034 -0.037 
  (0.300) (0.274) (0.278) (0.251) 
Generalized trust  0.021 0.020 0.024 -0.002 
  (0.547) (0.564) (0.482) (0.957) 
Thinks village members would work together  -0.007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.006 
  (0.750) (0.708) (0.629) (0.771) 
N. of good friends among parents  0.007 0.004 0.001 -0.003 
  (0.508) (0.678) (0.882) (0.727) 
N. of relatives among parents  **0.062** **0.060** **0.053** 0.047 
  (0.026) (0.030) (0.047) (0.101) 
Rural area   -0.029 -0.018 -0.021 
   (0.411) (0.611) (0.537) 
Standard deviation of wealth (school-level)   -0.096 -0.079 -0.075 
   (0.121) (0.204) (0.213) 
Religious homogeneity (district-level)   0.055* 0.062*  
   (0.077) (0.081)  
Coastal area    *-0.085**  
    (0.028)  
Tirana area    -0.002  
    (0.969)  
Mountain area    -0.044  
    (0.338)  
District fixed effects No No No No Yes 
Joint significance of geographical areas (p-value) - - - 0.142 - 
Joint significance of district f.e.(p-value) - - - - <0.001 
Observations 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 1,800 
Note: Robust standard errors have been clustered at the school level. P values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. We 
report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. In all regressions 
we control for the four geographical areas dummy variables; Tirana is the excluded geographical area. 
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 In three districts the majority of the population is Catholic, and in one district the majority is Orthodox. 
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In Table 2, we conduct probit regressions where the dependent variable is the individual decision to 
invest in the group rather than the private account in the game. We report marginal effects evaluated at 
the means for continuous explanatory variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous 
explanatory variables. In column 1 we control for demographics, and in column 2 we add individual 
measures of social engagement and involvement with children’s education. Given the significant 
differences in behavior across districts, in column 3 we add community characteristics generated by the 
school survey and the LSMS and in column 4 we add dummies for the Coastal, the Mountain, the Central 
and Tirana geographical areas. Finally, in column 5 we add district fixed effects. 
Two of the five models suggest that wealthier individuals are more likely to invest in the group 
account, whereas no significant differences based on age, gender and education exist. Among the social 
engagement measures, the number of relatives in the session increases cooperation in the game in three of 
the five models. This is not surprising, as the number of relatives among other participants is likely to 
affect one’s beliefs about others’ willingness to cooperate. On the other hand, the fact that the presence of 
“friends” in the session does not have a similar effect provides suggestive evidence that Albania is a 
close-knit, family oriented society. Table 2 columns 3 and 4 indicate that religious homogeneity 
significantly increases parents’ cooperativeness in the game. Moreover, parents seem to behave less 
cooperatively in the more culturally and linguistically heterogeneous coastal region. Finally, we note that 
none of the significant variables are robust to the inclusion of district fixed effects, confirming that much 
of the variation in individual willingness to cooperate with others for the common good occurs at the 
community level.   
 
5 Results 
 In this section, we first present results from individual-level regression analysis concerning the 
relationship between individuals’ cooperativeness and the short and the long routes to accountability, and 
then turn to district-level analysis. 
5.1 Individual-level analysis 
5.1.1   The short route to accountability 
We estimate individual-level Probit models where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the 
parent participated in the latest elections of parent class representatives, and zero otherwise. Table 3 
reports marginal effects evaluated at the mean for continuous explanatory variables and the effect of a 
change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous explanatory variables. In all regressions we cluster the standard 
errors at the school level. In the first model, we control for the four geographical areas identifying 
bbbbbbb 
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Table 3 
Cooperativeness and the short route to accountability (individual-level) 
Note: Robust standard errors have been clustered at the school level. P values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. We report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous 
variables. In all regressions we control for the four geographical areas dummy variables; Tirana is the excluded 
geographical area. In column (5) we restrict the sample to include only the parents that are informed about the existence 
of parent class representatives.  
 Dependent variable: 
Dummy equal to 1 if parent participated in the elections of the class 
parent representatives, 0 otherwise 
 Probit Probit Probit OLS Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Invested in group account in the game ***0.090*** **0.080** **0.082** *0.040* *0.067* 
 (0.005) (0.022) (0.017) (0.065) (0.059) 
Age  *0.003* 0.003 0.001 0.002 
  (0.094) (0.107) (0.398) (0.393) 
Female  0.044 *0.056* 0.033 0.034 
  (0.146) (0.066) (0.140) (0.289) 
Wealth index  *0.051*** **0.042** 0.013 0.017 
  (0.004) (0.020) (0.271) (0.304) 
Years of schooling  0.029*** 0.026*** *0.016** 0.020*** 
  (1E-09) (7E-08) (1E-05) (4E-05) 
Rural location  -0.096*** -0.106*** -0.020 -0.025 
  (0.005) (0.003) (0.405) (0.470) 
Distance from school (Km)  -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
  (0.665) (0.675) (0.592) (0.661) 
Member of a social organization   *0.155* 0.056 0.086 
   (0.065) (0.284) (0.272) 
Participated in community activities   0.122*** *0.062** *0.072* 
   (0.003) (0.032) (0.059) 
Thinks village members would work together   0.039 *0.051** *0.077** 
   (0.202) (0.033) (0.026) 
Generalized trust   *-0.080* -0.018 -0.034 
   (0.059) (0.510) (0.439) 
% of relatives and friends among other parents   0.010 0.005 0.007 
   (0.344) (0.486) (0.435) 
Help pupil with homework   -0.005 1E-04 0.002 
   (0.882) (0.995) (0.963) 
Number of meetings with head teacher    0.015*** *0.006* *0.009* 
   (0.001) (0.045) (0.070) 
Informed    0.629***  
    (0.000)  
Constant     -0.174*  
    (0.087)  
District fixed effects NO YES YES YES YES 
  Joint significance of district f.e.(p-value) - <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** <0.001*** 
Geographical areas dummies YES NO NO NO NO 
  Joint significance of geographical areas (p-
value) 
0.011** - - - - 
Observations 1800 1800 1800 1800 1302 
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different economic realities within the Albanian territory. In the other four models we introduce district 
fixed effects.  The district fixed effects are particularly important given the significant differences in 
behavior in the public goods game across districts identified in the previous section.32  
  In column 1 of Table 3 we do not include any controls beside the geographical area dummies. In 
column 2 we control for standard demographics,33 the urban or rural location of the surveyed school, the 
distance of the parent’s house from the school, and district fixed effects. In column 3 we add survey-
based measures of social engagement and of parents’ involvement with their children’s education.  
The estimates in all columns show a strong and robust correlation between parents’ decisions to 
invest in the group account in the public goods game and their participation in the elections of parent class 
representatives. 34   
One important factor, which we left out from the specifications in columns 1 to 3 is the extent to 
which parents are informed about the elections of parent class representatives. From the survey, we know 
whether parents are aware of the existence of both parent class representatives and school boards. Since 
being unaware of the existence of parent class representatives precludes participation in their election, we 
cannot control for this variable in our Probit models. We address this problem in two ways. First, in 
column 4 we estimate a linear probability model including parents’ information about parent class 
representatives as an additional explanatory variable. Second, in column 5, we estimate a Probit model 
similar to that presented in column 3, while restricting the sample to parents who are informed about the 
existence of parent class representatives. 
Column 4 and 5 of Table 3 show that, while, as expected, information is a determining factor of 
parents’ participation, parents’ willingness to cooperate with others in the public goods experiment 
remains a predictor of participation in the election of parent class representatives. Our result is also robust 
to restricting the sample to the informed parents and estimating a Probit model. The estimated coefficient 
becomes smaller as compared to column 3, but it retains statistical significance at the 10% level, with a p-
value of 0.057. 35 The smaller and less significant coefficient within the informed sample, suggests that 
those who invested in the group account were also more likely to select into the informed sub-sample. A 
simple econometric analysis confirms that those who invested in the group account were also more likely 
                                                           
32
 Owing to the limited number of observation in each session/school and the limited variation within schools, including school 
fixed effects would dramatically reduce our ability to identify any relationships. However, if we aggregate the data at the school 
level and rerun our analyses, the results are robust, i.e. we find that schools in which more parents are cooperative in the VCM 
game are characterized by higher parental participation in school elections. 
33
 While we do not have any prior about the relationship between participation and parents’ age and gender, we expect wealthier 
and better educated parents to place a higher value on their children’s education and face lower marginal costs of participation.  
34
 In our sample, 28% of the parents were or had previously been a parent class representative. If we include a parent 
representative dummy among the explanatory variables, we find that, as expected, (current or past) parent class representatives 
are significantly more likely to participate in the school election. On the other hand, current or past parent class representatives 
are not more or less likely to invest in the group account. The estimates are available from the authors upon request. 
35
 Table A4 in Appendix shows that the frame used in the example employed to explain the public goods game does not affect the 
predictive power of the behaviour in the game. 
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to select into the informed sub-sample. 36  These results provide suggestive evidence that acquiring 
information is effectively the first step toward participating. 
 
Table 4 
Cooperativeness and the long-route to accountability (self-reported) 
Note: Robust standard errors have been clustered at the district level. P-values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. We report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. 
In all regressions we control for three geographical areas dummy variables: coastal, center and mountain areas; Tirana is 
the excluded geographical area. 
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 Results are available from the authors. 
 Dependent variable: 
Dummy equal to 1 if parent participated in the 
2009 national elections, 0 otherwise 
 Probit Probit Probit 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Invested in group account in the game 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (3E-04) 
Age  0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (3E-05) (2E-05) 
Female  0.009 0.011 
  (0.434) (0.280) 
Wealth index  0.017** 0.015** 
  (0.024) (0.031) 
Years of schooling  0.003 0.002 
  (0.135) (0.307) 
Rural location  0.014 0.014 
  (0.283) (0.259) 
Distance from school (Km)  -0.004 -0.003 
  (0.275) (0.286) 
Participated in community activities   0.017 
   (0.243) 
Thinks village members would work together   0.022* 
   (0.055) 
Generalized trust   -0.027* 
   (0.074) 
% of relatives and friends among other parents   0.005 
   (0.175) 
Help pupil with homework   0.019 
   (0.119) 
Number of meetings with head teacher    0.002 
   (0.154) 
District fixed effects NO NO NO 
   Joint significance of district f.e. (p-value) - - - 
Geographical areas dummies YES YES YES 
   Joint significance of geographical areas dummies (p-value) 0.831 0.434 0.498 
County fixed effects NO YES YES 
     Joint significance of county f.e. (p-value) - <0.001*** <0.001*** 
Observations 1800 1800 1800 
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5.1.2  The long route to accountability 
In this subsection, we turn our attention to the long route to accountability and citizens’ willingness to 
hold public officials accountable through the instrument of the vote in parliamentary elections. We 
investigate whether parents who invested in the group account in the public goods game are more likely 
to have voted.  We asked parents whether they voted in the most recent (2009) parliamentary election and 
we also collected data on district-level voter turnout from official records. According to our School 
Stakeholder Survey, 93% of the parents voted in the 2009 parliamentary elections, whereas official 
records show that turnout was only 51%. Given this discrepancy, we make use of the data from both 
sources; we investigate whether parents’ behavior in the game correlates with turning out to vote both at 
the individual level using self-reported turnout and at the district level and, then repeat the district-level 
analysis using official turnout figures. The district level analysis is reported in Section 5.2. 
In Table 4, we report estimated coefficients from individual-level Probit estimations where the 
dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the parent stated that he/she voted in the 2009 
parliamentary elections and zero otherwise. We employ the specifications used when analyzing the short 
route to accountability, in Table 3. The only differences is that, owing to limited within-district variation 
in self-reported turn-out, we are unable to employ district fixed effects without losing a substantial 
number of observations. This is why in columns 2 and 3 of Table 4 we employ county fixed effects 
instead. We acknowledge that our set of controls is likely to be missing important explanatory variables, 
such as the extent of individual information about the parliamentary elections and the candidates, as well 
as the degree of exposure to electoral campaigns. The county fixed effects allow us to at least partially 
address geographical differences in information, campaigns and political alliances.  
Our experimental measure of cooperativeness is highly statistically significant and this is robust to 
changes in the empirical specification. The estimates indicate that parents who invested in the group 
account in the game are about 4% more likely to have voted in the most recent parliamentary elections.37  
  
5.2 District-level analysis 
In this section we investigate whether both parental participation in school accountability and 
participation in the 2009 parliamentary elections are higher in districts characterized by a higher fraction 
of individuals willing to cooperate with each other in collective action situations. 
                                                           
37
 While, as previously stated, we are not interested in the estimated coefficients of the attitudinal survey measures, which we 
included only as controls, we note that most of these variables appear with the expected, albeit intermittently significant positive 
sign. One exception is the survey measure of interpersonal trust, the negative sign on which suggests that parents who think that 
“most people can be trusted” are less likely to participate in the school accountability system and to vote in national elections. A 
speculative explanation for this result may be that more “trusting parents” trust others to make the right voting decisions, and/or 
trust teachers and politicians to act in the public’s best interest. 
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5.2.1  The short route to accountability 
We aggregate parents’ decisions to invest in the group account in the public good game and parents’ 
decision to participate in the election of parent class representatives at the district level, and investigate 
their correlation while controlling for district characteristics generated by the 2008 LSMS Albanian 
household survey. The sample size is therefore reduced to 36 observations (i.e. the number of Albanian 
districts).  
Table 5 
Cooperativeness and the short-route of accountability (district-level) 
 
Table 5 reports estimates from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the proportion of 
parents who participated in the school accountability system in a district, and the explanatory variable of 
interest is the proportion of parents who behaved cooperatively in the game. We control for the average 
income and average years of schooling in the district (column 2), district-level measures of social 
engagement (column 3), and other district characteristics (column 4) discussed in previous section, i.e. 
 Dependent Variable 
District-level percentage of parents who participated in 
the school accountability system in a district  
(School Survey) 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% parents investing in the group account in the district 0.565* 0.581* 0.753* 0.676* 
 (0.056) (0.074) (0.033) (0.089) 
ln of household income   -0.007 -0.018 -0.155 
  (0.897) (0.756) (0.364) 
Average years of schooling of the adult population  -0.006 -0.019 -0.015 
  (0.874) (0.639) (0.734) 
% people who belong to a social organization    -0.017 0.030 
   (0.925) (0.884) 
% people who participate in community activities   0.134 0.022 
   (0.484) (0.927) 
Average perception of village members’ willingness to work together   -0.143** -0.147** 
   (0.030) (0.041) 
% of people “trusting others”    0.060 0.157 
   (0.760) (0.498) 
Standard Deviation of household income     2E-08 
    (0.673) 
Prevalently Muslim    -0.031 
    (0.720) 
Religious homogeneity     0.031 
    (0.720) 
Northern region    0.043 
    (0.785) 
Constant 0.381 0.538 1.071 2.965 
 (0.228) (0.502) (0.179) (0.186) 
County fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
    Joint significance of county f.e. (p-value) 0.181 0.304 0.312 0.374 
Geographical areas dummies YES YES YES YES 
    Joint significance of geographical areas (p-value) 0.112 0.164 0.049 0.080 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
In all OLS regressions, we control for the geographical areas dummy variables: coastal, center and mountain areas; Tirana is the excluded 
geographical area.  P-values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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religious homogeneity, a northern region dummy, four geographical area dummies, whether or not the 
district is prevalently Muslim, and the standard deviation of income within the district. In all regressions 
we employ county fixed effects. Table 5 indicates that more “cooperative” districts are characterized by a 
higher parental participation in the school accountability system.  
 
5.2.2  The long route to accountability 
In Table 6 we employ district-level official records of turnout in the 2009 parliamentary elections as 
our dependent variable. We use the same empirical specifications as in Table 5.  
 
Table 6 
Cooperativeness and the long-route of accountability (official records) 
 Dependent Variable 
District-level percentage of citizens who voted in the 
2009 parliamentary elections (official records) 
 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
% parents investing in the group account in the district 0.114 0.162** 0.160** 0.166** 
 (0.133) (0.033) (0.033) (0.016) 
ln of household income   -0.029** -0.038*** -0.017 
  (0.033) (0.007) (0.533) 
Average years of schooling of the adult population   -0.001 0.004 0.003 
  (0.882) (0.619) (0.663) 
% people who belong to a social organization    0.082** 0.062* 
   (0.046) (0.082) 
% people who participate in community activities   0.040 -0.003 
   (0.324) (0.933) 
Average perception of village members’ willingness to work together   -0.023* -0.027** 
   (0.090) (0.024) 
% of people “trusting others”    0.012 0.024 
   (0.766) (0.517) 
Standard Deviation of household income     -5E-10 
    (0.857) 
Prevalently Muslim    -0.024 
    (0.177) 
Religious homogeneity     0.040** 
    (0.014) 
Northern region    0.063** 
    (0.027) 
Constant 0.468*** 0.826*** 0.904*** 0.761** 
 (0.080) (2E-04) (6E-05) (0.046) 
County fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
    Joint significance of county f.e. (p-value) <0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
Geographical areas dummies YES YES YES YES 
    Joint significance of geographical areas (p-value) 0.030 0.012 0.005 0.001 
Observations 36 36 36 36 
In all OLS regressions, we control for three geographical areas dummy variables: coastal, center and mountain areas; Tirana is the 
excluded geographical area.  P values in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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The estimates show a highly significant correlation between district-level cooperativeness in the 
public goods game, and voter turnout in the parliamentary elections. The correlation is robust to the 
inclusion of the district-level controls generated by the 2008 LSMS survey. The estimated coefficient 
indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the proportion of cooperating parents in a district is 
associated, ceteris paribus, with a 2 percentage point increase in participation in the elections. Table 6 
also indicates that turnout is higher in the northern region which, as previously discussed, is traditionally 
allied to the Democratic party that is in power since 2005. Consistent with the literature, the estimates 
also suggest that participation in parliamentary elections is higher in districts characterized by religious 
homogeneity.   
Our analysis identifies a robust correlation between individuals’ willingness to cooperate with others 
for the common good and participation in both school-level and national accountability systems and, 
thereby identifies a behavioral tendency that is important for participation in accountability systems. 
However, the nature of our data does not allow us to rule out the possibility of reverse causality. To partly 
mitigate the endogeneity concerns, we note that the election of parent representatives in schools was 
legislated for and expected to start at the same time in all the schools in the 2000s, so we can at least 
exclude that their institution or lack thereof is the result individuals’ attitudes to cooperation for the 
common good. Moreover, our understanding is that the parents of each class are expected to meet at the 
beginning of the school year with the sole objective to elect their parent representative. All parent 
representatives subsequently meet to elect their own representative to the school board and to discuss 
school problems, including parents’ concerns, with their school board representative. Therefore, at least 
on paper, the election meetings do not involve significant interactions among participants. Nevertheless, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that participation in these meetings increased participants’ willingness 
to work together. Unfortunately, we cannot solve the endogeneity bias empirically through IV estimation 
because there are no variables in our data that can be considered exogenous to the behavior in the VCM 
game and that, at the same time, we can claim are not directly linked to participation. Finally, we note that 
the potential endogeneity problem does not apply to the same extent to participation in national elections. 
It is difficult to think of reasons why the act of voting in the national election would render an individual 
more willing to cooperate with others for the common good.  
 
6 Discussion and conclusions  
In this paper, we argued that the decision to participate in both school-level and national accountability 
systems can be characterized as collective action problems. Therefore, individuals’ willingness to 
cooperate with others for the common good plays an important role in their decision to participate. This 
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being the case, differences across societies in individuals’ willingness and ability to overcome collective 
action problems might be one of the reasons why similar randomized interventions have generated 
different results when implemented in different countries. 
We investigated whether both at the individual- and the community-level, willingness to cooperate 
with others for the common good is associated with willingness to participate both in local and national 
accountability systems, which we refer to as, respectively, a short and a long route to accountability. We 
conducted a nationally representative survey of 1800 randomly selected parents of children enrolled in 
primary schools in Albania. In order to isolate the effect of individuals’ willingness to cooperate with 
others in collective action scenarios, we involved all the surveyed parents in a simple public goods game. 
At the individual-level, we tested whether parents who behaved cooperatively in the game were more 
likely to have participated in the most recent elections of parent class (i.e., the short route to 
accountability) and in the most recent parliamentary elections (i.e., the long route). At the community-
level, we tested whether districts characterized by more cooperative parents have higher participation in 
school accountability and higher voter turnout, based on official records, while controlling for district 
characteristics generated by the most recent LSMS household survey. 
Our empirical results show that cooperative parents are about 8 percent more likely to participate in 
the elections of parent class representatives and about 4 percent more likely to vote in national elections. 
This relationship remains significant after controlling for a range of variables including the degree to 
which parents are informed about the presence of local accountability institutions and district fixed 
effects. The district-level analysis indicates that districts characterized by a higher proportion of 
cooperative parents have a higher degree of participation in school accountability and a higher turnout in 
the 2009 elections, according to official records. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the 
proportion of cooperating parents in a district is associated, ceteris paribus, with a 2 percentage point 
increase in voter turnout. While the sizes of the identified relationships might appear small, they are quite 
substantial when compared to the estimated effects of various randomized interventions on individuals’ 
voting behavior. Green, Gerber, and Nickerson (2003) evaluated the effectiveness of a randomized 
intervention based on door-to-door canvassing before the November 6, 2001 US elections in six locations 
and found an average treatment effect of 7.1 percentage points. Gerber, Green and Larimer (2008) 
evaluated three randomized interventions aimed at increasing voter turnout in the 2006 primary elections 
in the state of Michigan. One intervention consisted in simply mailing a group of people a message 
reminding them that voting is a civic duty; one intervention consisted of telling voters that researchers 
would be studying their turnout based on public records and a final intervention consisted of telling 
people that the household voter turnout would be displayed to their neighbors. The Civic Duty 
intervention increase turnout by 1.8 percentage points; the “You Are Being Studied” intervention 
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increased turnout by 2.5 percentage points, and the Neighbors Intervention increased turnout by 8.1 
percentage points. The authors compared the marginal effects obtained from their treatments to those 
obtained by similar studies evaluating interventions attempting to increase voter turnout through 
messages and/or reminders sent to treated households by mail. They observed that “treatment effects in 
the 1.8 percentage point range, similar to the effects we observe for the Civic Duty mailing, are rare but 
not unprecedented, though one mail piece more commonly produces a result less than 1 percentage point. 
Results in the 5% to 8% range have never before been observed, even for a nine-piece mail program.”  
Our finding that both across individuals within districts and across districts willingness to cooperate is 
significantly associated with participation in short-route and long-route accountability systems could 
inform future research aimed at identifying ways to increase both local participation and civic 
engagement. Interventions attempting to improve collective action might be a viable and effective 
alternative (or addition) to interventions focusing purely on institutional changes or information 
campaigns. In the last three decades, experimental studies of cooperativeness in the public goods game 
have generated an extensive of body knowledge about why and when individuals are more likely to 
cooperate with others for the common good. Specifically, we know from lab experiments that (1) the 
majority of people are conditional cooperators, i.e., they cooperate if they think others will do likewise, 
and (2) that, this being the case, the dynamics of cooperation are driven by individual’s expectations 
about what others will do. 38 While identifying ways to promote collective action is beyond the scope of 
this paper, our findings together with findings from the existing experimental literature on public goods 
games suggest that efforts to improve individual citizens’ perceptions about other citizens’ willingness to 
participate in holding public servants to account might be an effective way to improve participation at 
both the local- and national-level. 
 
  
                                                           
38
 For a recent review of the public goods game literature, see Chaudhuri (2010) 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A1 
Survey Question 
2009 School 
Stakeholder 
Survey 
2008 
LSMS 
Measures of social engagement   
Do you belong to any social clubs, community-based organizations, economic 
organizations (such as microfinance groups), churches, mosques, or other social group 
in the community? 
  
In the past year, did you or any in your household participate in any communal 
activities, in which people came together to do some work for the benefit of the 
community? 
  
If there was a water supply problem, how likely is that people will cooperate to try to 
solve the problem? (1-5 Likert scale)   
In general, do you believe that most people can be trusted, or do you think that you 
can’t be too careful? 
  
   
Measures of parental involvement in education   
In the last 2 weeks, how often have you or another adult in the household helped your 
child/children with homework? 
  
How many times, in the last semester (January-May 2009), did you participate in these 
meetings to talk about [name]’s performance with his/her head teacher?   
In the past year how many times have you visited the school to have meetings with 
school principal, teachers, or the school board?  
 
Did you participate in this most recent election of Parents’ Representatives in [child’s 
name]’s class?   
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Table A2 
School-level pair-wise correlations between parental participation  
and school outcomes 
 
              
% participating 
parents 
Students who got 10 in Math (%) 0.1444* 
 
(0.0573) 
Students who got 10 in Albanian (%) 0.1399* 
 
(0.0656) 
Drop-out rate -0.0628 
 
(0.4332) 
Failure rate (in the final exam) -0.1454* 
 
(0.0562) 
Repetition rate -0.1246* 
 
(0.0985) 
% parents unsatisfied with the school -0.248*** 
 
(0.0008) 
% parents perceiving embezzlement of construction funds -0.1199 
 
(0.1089) 
% parents perceiving embezzlement of scholarship funds -0.1332* 
 
(0.0748) 
Note: P-values in parentheses 
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Table A3 
Parental participation in schools and cooperation in the game by district 
District % participating parents 
% cooperating 
parents  District 
% participating 
parents 
% cooperating 
parents 
Delvine 75% 95% 
  
Pogradec 53% 88% 
Mat 70% 88% Bulqize 50% 58% 
Has 68% 85% Gjirokaster 48% 90% 
Fier 67% 67% Mirdite 48% 68% 
Kukes 67% 80% Puke 48% 73% 
Kurbin 67% 70% Tepelene 48% 98% 
Tirane 66% 76% Kolonje 45% 90% 
Kruje 62% 70% Permet 45% 78% 
Mallakaster 60% 75% Lushnje 43% 47% 
Sarande 60% 63% Lezhe 35% 67% 
Gramsh 58% 68% M.Madhe 33% 83% 
Kucove 58% 63% Tropoje 33% 88% 
Skrapar 58% 75% Durres 33% 68% 
Berat 58% 68% Kavaje 33% 70% 
Librazhd 58% 78% Korce 32% 78% 
Devoll 55% 95% Peqin 28% 80% 
Diber 55% 80% Elbasan 25% 77% 
Vlore 55% 85% 
  
Shkoder 18% 62% 
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Table A4 
Framing effects 
 Dependent variable: 
Dummy equal to 1 if the parent voted in the elections  
of the class parent representatives, 0 otherwise 
 Probit Probit –Restricted sample 
 (1) (2) 
Invested in group account in the game 0.102** 0.092** 
 (0.019) (0.046) 
Farming example in the game -0.036 0.017 
 (0.530) (0.766) 
Farming example x invested in the group account -0.039 -0.051 
 (0.560) (0.471) 
Age 0.003 0.002 
 (0.132) (0.421) 
Female 0.059* 0.034 
 (0.054) (0.281) 
Wealth index 0.044** 0.018 
 (0.017) (0.292) 
Years of schooling 0.025*** 0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Rural location -0.096*** -0.022 
 (0.007) (0.520) 
Distance from school (Km) -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.679) (0.636) 
Member of a social organization 0.162* 0.084 
 (0.054) (0.282) 
Participation in community activities 0.119*** 0.071* 
 (0.003) (0.062) 
Think that community members would work together 0.034 0.076** 
 (0.264) (0.029) 
General trust in others -0.079* -0.036 
 (0.059) (0.429) 
Number of relatives and friends among parents 0.012 0.008 
 (0.276) (0.396) 
Help pupil with homework -0.003 0.003 
 (0.930) (0.927) 
Number of meetings with head teacher  0.015*** 0.009* 
 (0.001) (0.070) 
District fixed effects YES YES 
    Joint significance of district f.e. (p-value) <0.001*** <0.001*** 
Observations 1,800 1,302 
Note: report marginal effects of continuous variables and the effect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. In Column 2 we 
restrict the analysis to the informed parents. Robust standard errors have been clustered at the school level. P values in parentheses: *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.We 
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Experimental Instructions 
The Public good game 
 
PRESENTATION TO THE GROUP 
We are now ready to begin playing a game that will involve all of you. Each one of you will make his or her 
decision alone and in private, at the same time as everyone else. Based on the decision that you and the other 
participants in the game make, this game could earn you between 100 and 1900 LEK, although it is rare for people 
to earn 1900 LEK. 
The decision that you make in this game is strictly confidential; in order to guarantee confidentiality we ask you not 
to communicate with each other at any time during the game. If you talk to each other we will have to stop the game 
and nobody will get any money from the workshop. 
At the start of this game each of you will receive a voucher. The each of you has to decide whether to invest the 
voucher in: 
- a PRIVATE Account (P) 
 
or 
 
- a GROUP Account (G) 
If you invest your voucher in the GROUP Account you will receive 100 LEK for every voucher that you and the 
other participants have invested in the GROUP Account. 
If you invest your voucher on the Private Account your earnings will be determined as follows: first you will receive 
a fix private return of 500 LEK; second, you will also receive 100 LEK for every voucher that the other participants 
have decided to invest in the GROUP Account. 
You will soon receive a voucher like this one on the board, only smaller. At the bottom of the voucher you will see 
two big letters: a letter P and a letter G. The letter P, on the left, stands for “Private Account”; the letter G, on the 
right, stands for “GROUP Account”. If you want to invest your voucher in a Private Account you must to draw a 
circle around the letter P. If you want to invest your voucher in the GROUP Account you must draw a circle around 
the letter G. We will now go through some examples.  
1. Suppose that you invest your voucher in the GROUP Account, which means that you circled the letter S on your 
voucher. [Write the letter P on the left of the board, and the letter G on the right, in capital letters, as in the 
voucher. Then, circle the letter G]. And suppose that everyone invested their voucher in the GROUP Account. 
[Write 15 below the letter G and 0 below the letter P].  
Then you and the each of the other participants will receive 100x15=1500 LEK from this game.[Write 
100x15=1500 in a box on the right of the number 15, below the letter G. Link the number 15 and the box with 
an arrow]  
 
2. Suppose that you invest your voucher in the GROUP Account, which means that you circled the letter S on your 
voucher. [Point the letter G on the board, that you have circled before] And suppose that, in total, two people 
invested their vouchers in Private Accounts and 13 people, you and 12 others, invested in the GROUP Account. 
[Write the number 2 below the letter P and the number 13 below the letter G]. Then you and the other 
participants who invested in the GROUP Account would each receive 100x13=1300 LEK [write this amount in 
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a box on the right of the number 13, as before] from this game, and each of the participants who invested their 
vouchers in the Private Account will each receive 1300 LEK from the GROUP Account PLUS 500 LEK from 
their Private Account, making a total of 1800 LEK.[write this amount on the left of the number 2, in a box, as 
before] 
 
3. Suppose that you invest your voucher in a Private Account, which means that you circled the letter P on your 
voucher. [Now, circle the letter P]. And suppose that, in total, 10 people, you and 9 others, invested their 
vouchers in Private Accounts [write 10 under the letter P] and 5 people invested in the GROUP Account. 
[Write 5 under the letter G]. Then, each of the participants who invested their vouchers in the GROUP Account 
will receive 100x5=500 LEK from this game [Write this amount in a box on the right of the number 5] and you 
and each of the other people who invested in a Private Account will receive 500 LEK from the GROUP 
Account PLUS 500 LEK from your Private Account, making a total of 1000 LEK. [Write this amount in a box 
on the left of the number 10, as before] 
 
4. Suppose that you invest your voucher in a Private Account, which means that you circled the letter P on your 
voucher. And suppose that everyone invested their vouchers in Private Accounts. Then, since nobody invested 
in the GROUP Account, nobody gets anything from that account and everybody goes home with the 500 LEK 
from their Private Account. 
 
Is it clear to everybody? 
 
Remember that if you invest in the Group Account you get (100 x Number of people who invested in the Group 
Account). If instead you invest in the Private Account you get (100 x Number of people who invested in the Group 
Account + 500). 
 
Let’s go through more examples. 
 
Can you answer the following questions? 
 
5. Suppose that in total, 5 people invested their vouchers in Private Accounts. How many people invested in the 
Group Account? (10) [After people answer the question, write the number 5 below the letter P and the number 
10 below the letter G]. Then, how much did the people who invested in the Group Account get? (100 x 10 = 
1000) [After people answer the question, write this amount in a box on the right of the number 10, as before]. 
And how much did the people who invested in the Private Account get? (500 + 1000 = 1500) [After people 
answer this question, write this amount on the left of the number 5, in a box, as before] 
 
6. Suppose that in total, 7 people invested their vouchers in Private Accounts. How many people invested in the 
Group Account? (8) [After people answer the question, write the number 7 below the letter P and the number 8 
below the letter G]. Then, how much did the people who invested in the Group Account get? (100 x 8 = 800) 
[After people answer the question, write this amount in a box on the right of the number 8, as before]. And how 
much did the people who invested in the Private Account get? (500 + 800 = 1300) [After people answer this 
question, write this amount on the left of the number 7, in a box, as before] 
 
7. Suppose that in total, 14 people invested their vouchers in Private Accounts. How many people invested in the 
Group Account? (21 [After people answer the question, write the number 14 below the letter P and the number 
1 below the letter G]. Then, how much did the people who invested in the Group Account get? (100 x 1 = 100) 
[After people answer the question, write this amount in a box on the right of the number 1, as before]. And how 
much did the people who invested in the Private Account get? (500 + 100 = 600) [After people answer this 
question, write this amount on the left of the number 14, in a box, as before] 
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Is this all clear to everybody now? Are you sure?  
Remember that all the participants benefit from the vouchers invested in the GROUP Account, whereas only you 
benefit from the voucher invested in the Private Account. 
This game is designed to simulate a type of dilemma that many of us find ourselves in at various points in our lives. 
For example: 
[School Example: Imagine a community with its own primary school. After finishing primary school, the children 
go to secondary schools elsewhere and imagine a situation where only children who perform well in the final test sat 
in year 9 can get a scholarship. If all the parents invest resources, including time and effort, to make sure that the 
primary school runs well, all the children are likely to learn while in school and do well in the exam, which means 
that they all have a good chance of getting into the best secondary school. However, each parent knows that even if 
he does not invest his resources in the school, other parents are likely to do so; therefore his child will benefit 
anyway while he will still have resources to invest privately for his child, for example by paying for private lessons. 
So, each parent faces an incentive to keep their resources and not invest in the school; however, if all the parents 
decide not to invest in the school, the school will not perform well and their child’s success will depend solely on 
their private investment in the child’s education.  
So, like in the game, the dilemma for each parent is:- 
- Invest in the school and benefit all children but face the risk of being the only parent investing resources in the 
school, and therefore being taken advantage of by the other parents  
Or 
-  Do not invest in the school in the hope that someone else will, bearing in mind that if all parents decide not to 
contribute to the school all the children will be disadvantaged] 
 
[Farming Example: Imagine a village where a group of farmers share a water pump. If the pump breaks all of them 
get less water to their land. When the pump breaks, the ideal situation is for all the farmers to spend resources, 
including time and effort, to repair it immediately and the more of them put together resources to repair the pump 
the easier and quicker the mending is. However, each farmer knows that even if he does not contribute to the 
mending of the pump, other farmers are likely to do so. So, each farmer faces an incentive not to contribute to the 
mending of the pump; however if all the farmers decide not to contribute to the mending of the pump, the pump is 
left broken and they all suffer.  
So, like in the game, the dilemma for each farmer is:- 
-    Contribute to the mending of the pump and benefit all farmers, but face the risk of being the only one 
contributing and therefore being taken advantage of by the other farmers 
Or 
- Do not contribute to the mending of the pump in the hope that someone else will, bearing in mind that if all the 
farmers decide not to contribute, everyone will suffer 
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Remember that we have designed this game so that the other participants in the game will never know the decisions 
that each of you make. The only information that we will give to all participants at the end of the game is the total 
number of people who invested in the GROUP Account.  
We are now going to distribute one voucher to each of you. Your color and player number is written at the top. At 
the bottom of the voucher you will see a letter P and a letter G, just like here on the board. If you want to invest the 
voucher in a Private Account, you must draw a circle around the letter P. If you want to invest the voucher in the 
GROUP Account, you must draw a circle around the letter G. 
Are there any questions on how to play this game? 
[Distribute vouchers] 
Please check your color and player number on the voucher. If these are not right we will not be able to pay you 
correctly for the game. 
Then circle either the P or the G. When you are done please fold the voucher.  Then raise your hand and [name of 
RA] will come and collect your voucher. 
 
